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ABSTRACT

While the multiplication of international courts shows the vitality and
versatility of international law, it can also create serious problems for its unity
and coherence and ultimately lead to its fragmentation. After briefly analyzing
the reasons for the expansion of international jurisdictions, this article delves
into the dangers that such a phenomenon poses to the integrity and cohesiveness
of international law. The fact that international courts do not stand in
hierarchical relation to one another explains such problematic aspects as the
potential for jurisdictional overlapping and the risk of inconsistent interpretations of international rules. On the positive side, such institutional multiplicity is an indication of the increasingly important role played by international
courts in the field of international dispute settlement and provides fertile ground
for exploration of new concepts and ideas, which is bound to improve the
quality of international law and strengthen the rule of law in inter-state
relations.
I. INTRODUCTION

Arguably, one of the most significant developments in the recent history
of international relations is the enormous expansion and transformation of
international judicial institutions. Since its creation in 1920 and for the three
subsequent decades, the Permanent Court of International Justice and its
successor, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), were the sole permanent fora
*
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for the settlement of international disputes. From the early 1950s, the ICJ coexisted with two other international courts based in Europe, the European Court
of Human Rights (ECHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Coal and
Steel Community, later to become the European Court of Justice (ECJ). These
three institutions basically stood alone in the international judicial arena until
international judiciary bodies started to multiply, roughly three decades ago.
In 1981, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights rendered its first
judgment and, one year later, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) provided for the creation of the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea (ITLOS), which began to function in 1996. In the early 1990s,
the Central American Integration System gave birth to the Central American
Court of Justice, and the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization
(WTO), signed in 1994 in Marrakesh, included a quasi-judicial dispute
settlement mechanism for trade-related issues. The ad hoc International
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were also set up in the midnineties, as were the Court of Justice of the Andean Community and the African
Court of Human and Peoples' Rights. The Caribbean Court of Justice, the
African Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court saw the light at
the turn of the twenty-first century. Finally, a number of so-called hybrid
jurisdictions, that is, courts consisting of both national and international judges,
can be added to this non-exhaustive enumeration: the Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon.
The multiplication of international judicial bodies is a development that
shows the vitality and versatility of international law and contributes to the
strengthening of the rule of law in inter-state relations. However, the expansion
of these bodies can also create serious problems for the unity and coherence of
international law, encouraging phenomena such as jurisdictional competition
and forum shopping, and giving rise to potentially divergent and incompatible
interpretations of international norms. This article addresses the issue of the
expansion of international jurisdictions, analyzing both its causes and its
consequences, with particular emphasis on some of its most undesirable sideeffects.
11. CAUSES OF THE PROLIFERATION OF INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTIONS

The origin of the proliferation of international courts can be traced back
to the systemic transformation of international relations brought about by the
process of globalization. Much has been said about the causes of this process,
from the technological revolution in the fields of transport and telecommunications to the triumph of the doctrines of market economy and free trade, from the
liberalization of investment and the deregulation of financial markets, to the end
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of bipolarism and its replacement by a multilateral approach to world
affairs--challenged nonetheless by unilateral stances on issues of peace and
security and, to a certain extent, commercial and environmental matters.
Leaving aside the controversy about its etiology, globalization has been
both a cause and a consequence of the expansion and diversification of
international relations over the last few decades. The growth of inter-state
cooperation in many areas has been coupled with the expansion of international
law to domains hitherto excluded from multilateral arrangements (such as trade,
development, environment, human rights, terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction, to name but a few). As a result, new international organizations
have been created, and the existing ones transformed to deal with this evergrowing panoply of issues that now cover almost every domain of human
activity.
As Professor Cesare Romano puts it, the multiplication of international
judicial fora is, to a certain extent, "the precipitate of the accrued normative
density of the international legal system."' Indeed, since states "increasingly
vest specialized international organizations with the power to create
international legal standards," it is only natural for them to empower those
organizations "to interpret and uphold such standards."2 On the other hand,
following the pattern set by the European Union (EU), other regional
integration organizations, such as the Andean Community, the Common Market
for Eastern and Southern Africa, and the Arab Maghreb Union, have also
created judicial bodies for the purpose of settling disputes between members
arising out of the implementation of their treaties and agreements, upholding
the rules and provisions contained therein, ensuring their consistent interpretation and securing continuous access to legal remedies.'
Together with the enlargement of the material scope of operation of
international law, there has been a multiplication of actors in international
relations, with growing functions performed by non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), multinational corporations and private individuals.4 These non-state
players increasingly engage in transnational activities, and as a result there is
a growing tendency to grant them some degree of international personality,
even though, as Professor Malanczuk acknowledges, the whole subject remains
1.
Cesare P. R. Romano, The ProliferationofinternationalJudicialBodies: The Piecesof the
Puzzle, 31 (No. 4) N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 709, 729 (1999).
2.

Id.

3.

Id. at 735.

4.
Although globalization has not brought about the end of the state, it has contributed to its
disaggregation and to the emergence oftransnational networks, in which public institutions interact with their
counterparts abroad as well as with private parties that are increasingly performing many of the traditional
functions of the state. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct.
1997, at 183, 184.
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extremely controversial. 5 In any case, one of the many implications of this
development is that international law is being increasingly invoked by
individuals, corporations and NGOs not only in their own courts but also in
foreign ones, and pressure is mounting to allow them some sort of participation
in international adjudication when it affects them.6
In conclusion, the enlargement of the scope of international law both
ratione materiae and ratione personae has led to an unprecedented
multiplication of international judicial fora. This responds to a large extent to
recent developments in world affairs and may be considered a way for the
international legal system to adapt to fundamental changes in inter-state
relations. As mentioned before, this phenomenon undoubtedly has positive
effects since it enforces the rule of law in international relations. As Professor
Pierre Dupuy points out, the establishment of new jurisdictions makes
international disputes more justiciable and improves the efficiency of
international law by contributing to the implementation of obligations while
creating "a more refined and precise system of interpretation of norms."7 At the
same time, it helps generate a more objective system of international rules,
since it is "less and less characterized by self-appreciation of legality by its
subjects and authors, the sovereign states."8 Therefore, in Dupuy's opinion,
"the growing number of international jurisdictions.., should be seen ...as a
decisive step in the evolution of the international legal system as it develops a
real judicial function." 9

5.
P. MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (7th rev.
ed. 1997). On the position of non-state actors in international law, see id. at 96-104.
6.
In this respect, however, there is a "sharp dichotomy" between judicial bodies with a universal
scope and regional judicial bodies: whereas the former "remain much more impervious" to non-state actors,
regional judicial bodies are relatively accessible to them. Professor Romano explains this accessibility in the
following terms:
At the moment at which international organizations receive power to affect
individuals' interests directly, it becomes essential to guarantee the substance of the
legal protection normally found under national law in new international fora. If such
guarantee is not provided, either individuals risk being stripped ofjudicial protection
or, if they have retained the right to have recourse against the REIA's [Regional
Economic Integration Agreement] legislation in the courts of member states, the
consistent interpretation of the regime's normative structure cannot be ensured.
Romano, supra note 1, at 743-45.
7.
Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The DangerofFragmentationor Unification of the InternationalLegal
System and the InternationalCourt of Justice, 31 (No. 4) N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 791, 796 (1999).
8.

Id.

9.

Id.
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Ill. RISKS ENSUING FROM THE MULTIPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS

For all the benefits it certainly has, the creation of new jurisdictions may
also entail some dangers to the unity and integrity of international law, mainly
owing to the fact that international judicial bodies do not stand in hierarchical
relation to one another. Two of these dangers are worthy of note: the risk of
conflicting jurisdiction and the threat of divergent jurisprudence. As for the
first, the potential for overlapping jurisdictions has increased with the
multiplication of international courts, paving the way to a form of interinstitutional competition between courts and enabling a party to a dispute,
normally the one taking the initiative, to choose the judicial body that best suits
its interests.1 0 Although this practice, known as forum shopping, may foster a
certain spirit of healthy competition between judicial bodies and stimulate their
imagination and creativity, it also has negative implications that have been
voiced by, among others, the former President of the ICJ, Gilbert Guillaume.
In his opinion, all judicial bodies tend, consciously or not, to assess their worth
by reference to the frequency with which they are seized. As a result, some
courts could "be led to tailor their decisions so as to encourage a growth in their
caseload, to the detriment of a more objective approach to justice."" Such a
situation could arise, for example, in the field of maritime disputes, in which
both the ITLOS and the ICJ have jurisdiction. 12 In this respect, Professor
Kingsbury considers that a case of forum shopping may be found in the dispute
between New Zealand and Australia, on the one hand, and Japan, on the other,
concerning southern bluefin tuna conservation.' 3 He suggests that one of the
reasons underlying the plaintiffs' decision to proceed under Part XV of the
UNCLOS rather than invoking the jurisdiction of the ICJ pursuant to the

10.
This choice may be based on criteria such as the court's composition, its procedural rules, its
case-law or its power to make some particular decisions that other jurisdictions may not be entitled to take.
See Press Release, I.C.J., The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Outlook for the Int'l Legal
Order, Speech by His Excellency Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President of the I.C.J., to the Sixth Committee of
the General Assembly of the U.N. (Oct. 27, 2000), http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/index.php?p1=6&p2=
I&pr=85&search=%22nagymaros %22 (last visited Sept. 6, 2008).
11.

Id.

12.
See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 282, 286-87, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397. Under Articles 286 and 287 of the UNCLOS, the ITLOS may be given jurisdiction to hear
cases related to the interpretation and application of the Convention. Jurisdiction may also be conferred on
the ICJ by virtue of Article 282 of the UNCLOS. Id.
13.
The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (N.Z. & Austl. v. Japan), 117 I.L.R. 148, 152-53 (Int'l Trib.
L. of the Sea 1999). In what can be regarded as an example of conflicting jurisprudence, the provisional
measures granted by the ITLOS were subsequently revoked by an arbitration tribunal set up by the parties to
decide on the merits, which found that it lacked jurisdiction. On the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, see
generallyHoward S. Schiffinan, UNCLOS andMarine Wildlife Disputes: Big Splash or Barely a Ripple?,
4 J. INT'L WILDLIFE L. & POL'Y 257, 271-76 (2001).
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declarations made under Article 36(2) of its Statute was the "explicitly binding
nature of the ITLOS provisional measures."' 4 Similarly, in the Swordfish
Stocks case, 5 the parties to the dispute invoked the jurisdiction of two fora at
the same time: the ITLOS and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. 6 As
these two cases indicate, it is not far-fetched to think that, in the future,
proceedings could be brought to a particular court based on the fact that it is
more sympathetic to certain doctrines, concepts or interests than others.
The second problem arising from the proliferation of judicial bodies is the
risk of divergent jurisprudence. As Professor Jonathan I. Charney points out,
normative systems of law are based on the assumption that like cases are treated
alike. 7 Ifthis were not the case, the "legitimacy of international law as a whole"
would be challenged and the very "perception that an international legal system
exists" could be called into question.' The President of the ICJ, Judge Rosalyn
Higgins, considers the potential for inconsistent jurisprudence to be real,
"[h]owever understandable the reasons for the arrival of the new tribunals on the
international scene and however true it is that in large part they do what the ICJ,
because of its Statute and nature, cannot do."' 9 In dealing with the issue of
20
fragmentation of international law, the International Law Commission (ILC)
14.
Benedict Kingsbury, Foreword: Is the Proliferationof InternationalCourts and Tribunalsa
Systemic Problem?,31 (No.4) N.Y.U.J. INT'LL. &POL. 679,685(1999). However, this particular question
has lost part of its interest after the ICJ judgment in the LaGrandcase, in which the Court recognized the
binding nature of its orders for provisional measures. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 503
(June 27).
15.
Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific
Ocean (Chile v. Eur. Cmty.), Special Chamber, 40 I.L.M. 475, 475 (Dec. 20).
16.
However, after reaching an arrangement on the dispute, Chile and the EU jointly requested that
the proceedings before the 1TLOS and the WTO be suspended. See Schiffman, supra note 13, at 267.
17.
Jonathan I. Charney, The Impact on the International Legal System of the Growth of
InternationalCourts and Tribunals, 31 (No. 4) N.Y.U. J. INT'L. & POL. 697, 699 (1999).
18.

Id.

19.
Rosalyn Higgins, The ICJ, the EC, and the Integrity of InternationalLaw, 52 (No. 1) INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 1, 18 (2003).
20.
In 2002, the ILC included the topic "Fragmentation of international law: difficulties arising
from the diversification and expansion of international law" in its program of work and established a Study
Group on the topic. See U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., ILC Report on the Work of its Fifty-Fifth Session 410,
U.N. Doc. A/58/10 (2003) [hereinafter ILC Fifty-Fifth Session Report]. It also decided to undertake a series
of studies on the following issues: (a) The function and scope of the lex specialis rule and the question of
"self-contained regimes;" (b) The interpretation of treaties in the light of"any relevant rules of international
law applicable in the relations between the parties" (art. 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties), in the context of general developments in international law and concerns of the international
community; (c) The application of successive treaties relating to the same subject matter (art. 30 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties); (d) The modification of multilateral treaties between certain of
the parties only (art. 41 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties); (e) Hierarchy in international law:
jus cogens, obligations erga omnes, Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, as conflict rules. Vienna
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identified different patterns of divergentjurisprudence arising from three types
of possible conflicts.2 '
The first conflict is between different interpretations of general law. The
Tadid case, of which the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) was seized in 1999, offers a prime example of this type of
situation. For the Tribunal to determine its competence, it had to come to the
conclusion that there was an international armed conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which in turn required the establishment of the fact that some of
the participants in the internal conflict in that country were acting under the
control of a foreign power, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (as Serbia and
Montenegro was then called). In its judgment, the Appeals Chamber of the
Tribunal referred to the decision of the ICJ in the Nicaraguacase,24 but only to
embark on a different course.25 In that instance, the ICJ had declared that for
a military or paramilitary group to be regarded as acting on behalf of a foreign
power in an apparently internal armed conflict, the foreign state had to exercise
"effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of
which the alleged violations [of human rights and humanitarian law] were
committed."26 The ICTY, however, departed from this approach, based on
article 8 of the ILC Articles on state responsibility, and instead opted for a less
strict criterion-the "overall control" of the groups by a foreign state-adopting
a new interpretation of international law in the matter of state responsibility.27
The divergence resurfaced in the Genocide case,28 opposing Bosnia and
Herzegovina to Serbia and Montenegro, where the ICJ rejected the "overall
control" doctrine and reaffirmed the validity of the "effective control" test to
conclude that the acts of genocide at hand were not committed by individuals
acting on the instructions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or under its

Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 30, 31(3)(c), 41 May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 243; U.N. Charter
art. 103. See ILC Fifty-Fifth Session Report, supra, 1425, 427. In 2006, the Study Group completed its
work and adopted a report on the issue. Subsequently, the ILC decided to take note of the conclusions
included in the report and commended them to the attention of the General Assembly. See U.N. GAOR, 61st
Sess., ILC Report on the Work of its Fifty-Eighth Session IN 233, 237, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006).
21.

ILC Fifty-Fifth Session Report, supranote 20,

22.

Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-I-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment,

419.

23.

Id. 147.

24.

Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).

25.

Id.See Tadid, supranote 22, 1115.

26.

Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 24, at 65.

27.

Tadid, supra note 22,

1 146 (July

15, 1999).

122.

28.
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), Judgment, 46 I.L.M. 188, 188 (Feb. 26) (hereinafter Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb.
& Mont. Case].
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direct control and therefore could not be attributed to that state.29 However, as
Professor Cannizzaro points out, in this case the ICJ felt compelled to justify
why it deviated from the Tribunal case law, and in so doing provided "guidance
for future cases as to the type and degree of deference" which should be given
to decisions from other international courts.3"
A second type of conflict arises when a special body diverges from the
general rule "not as a result of disagreement as to the general law but on the
basis that a special law applies."3 1 In this case, no change is envisaged to the
general law; the special body simply considers that a special law is applicable
to the issue and acts accordingly. An example of such a body is the ECHR,
which, on a number of occasions, has departed from the ICJ on issues
concerning the validity of reservations considered to be incompatible with the
European Convention of Human Rights. In the Belilos case,32 for instance, the
ECHR understood an interpretative declaration made by Switzerland as
constituting a reservation,3 3 which was subsequently held invalid and severed
from the instrument of ratification of the declaring state.34 As a result, the
Court determined that the disputed provision-the effect of which the
declaration was purported to exclude-was binding since, in its view, it was
considered "beyond doubt" that Switzerland "[was], and regard[ed] itself as,
bound by the Convention irrespective of the validity of the declaration."35 In

29.

Id. at 287, 288, 291.

30.
See Enzo Cannizzaro, InterconnectingInternationalJurisdictions: A Contributionfrom the
Genocide Decision of the ICJ, 1 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 7 (2007). In paragraph 403 of itsjudgment, the ICJ
acknowledged that it
...[alttaches the utmost importance to the factual and legal findings made by the
ICTY in ruling on the criminal liability of the accused before it and, in the present
case, the Court takes fullest account of the ICTY's trial and appellate judgments
dealing with the events underlying the dispute. The situation is not the same for
positions adopted by the ICTY on issues of general international law which do not lie
within the specific purview of its jurisdiction and, moreover, the resolution of which
is not always necessary for deciding the criminal cases before it.
Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont. Case, 46 I.L.M. at 288. In Cannizzaro's words, the Court considered that
the authority of the Tribunal would depend on whether, in deciding a certain question,
the Tribunal remained within the scope of its jurisdiction, as ascertained by the ICJ...
[T]his passage of the judgment, perhaps beyond the subjective intention of its judges,
foreshadows a methodological approach which can be useful in case ofjurisdictional
overlaps.
Cannizzaro, supra note 30 at 3, 7.
31.

See ILC Fifty-Fifth Session Report, supra note 20, 419.

32.

Belilos v. Switzerland, App. No. 10328/83, 10 Eur. H.R. Rep. 466 (1988).

33.

Id. at 481.

34.

Id.

35.

Id. at 487.
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the case of Loizidou v. Turkey,36 a declaration by Turkey limiting the jurisdiction of the ECHR to acts or omissions performed within Turkish national
territory was deemed a reservation" and struck down as incompatible with the
object and purpose of the Convention.38 Judge Guillaume considers that the
decision diverges from the case-law of the ICJ, which "like its predecessor the
Permanent Court of International Justice, has consistently held that such
reservations are legal and must be upheld."39 However, the ECHR found
convincing reasons for separating the practice under the European Convention
from that of the ICJ.4 ° Finally, the ECHR has also dismissed interpretations of
international agreements or general international law rules aimed at creating
exceptions to the obligations of the contracting states under the European
Convention of Human Rights.4' This is what happened in the case of Waite and
Kennedy v. Germany42 when the ECHR declared that the attribution of
immunity from jurisdiction to international organizations could not "absolve"
the contracting states "from their responsibility under the Convention in
relation to the field of activity covered by such attribution," particularly as
regards the right of access to court, "in view of the prominent place held in a
democratic society by the right to a fair trial."4 3 However, in this case the Court
did not ultimately find such attribution of immunity to be incompatible with the
purpose and object of the Convention, since the international organization in
question had provided the applicants with an alternative means of legal
redress."

36.
Turkey].

Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89,20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 99 (1995) [hereinafter Loizidou v.

37.
The applicant in this case had submitted that the element of territorial restriction in the Turkish
declaration was "tantamount to a disguised reservation." Id. at 132.
38.

Id. at 137.

39.

See Press Release, I.C.J., supranote 10.

40.
The ECHR declared that given the fundamental differences between both Courts in terms of
the context in which they operate ("the International Court is called on inter alia to examine any legal dispute
between States that might occur in any part of the globe with reference to principles of international law" and
"the subject-matter of a dispute may relate to any area of international law") and their function ("the role of
the International Court is not exclusively limited to direct supervisory functions in respect of a law-making
treaty such as the Convention"), there was "a compelling basis for distinguishing Convention practice from
that of the International Court." Loizidou v. Turkey, supra note 36, at 136.
41.
See Gerhard Hafner, Risks Ensuingfrom Fragmentationof InternationalLaw, U.N. GAOR,
55th Sess., ILC Report on the Work of its Fifty-Second Session, at 323-24 Annex, U.N. Doe. A/55/10/Annex
(Sept. 27, 2000).
42.

Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, App. No. 26083/94, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 261 (1999).

43.

Id. at 287.

44.

Id. at 288.
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The third type of conflict identified by the ILC appears when specialized
fields of law seem to be at variance with each other. In a number of cases, for
example, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO dispute
settlement mechanisms have been requested to determine whether trade
restrictions to protect the environment are permissible under the legal system
created by those agreements. Jurisprudence on this issue is far from being
consistent, as shown by the decisions in the Tuna/Dolphin45 and Shrimp/Turtle46
disputes. In 1994, a GATT dispute settlement panel ruled that a United States
embargo on tuna harvested with techniques detrimental to dolphins was illegal
under GATT rules.47 While in its report the panel noted that "the objective of
sustainable development, which includes the protection and preservation of the
environment, has been widely recognized by the contracting parties to the
General Agreement," 8 it considered environmental treaties irrelevant to the
interpretation of the text of the GATT Agreement.49
This approach, however, was rejected in the Shrimp/Turtle case, which
concerned a measure prohibiting imports of shrimp into the United States from
countries that did not enforce the use of turtle protection devices similar to
those under operation in the United States.5" In this instance, the WTO
Appellate Body clearly underscored the significance of environmental
protection and preservation for the WTO members, as well as the need for them
to adopt effective measures to protect endangered species and to act together
bilaterally or multilaterally, within the WTO or other entities, to protect such
species or the environment at large. 5' Yet, it declared that for these kind of
measures to be permissible, they had to conform to the requirement set out in
the introductory paragraph of Article XX of the GATT Agreement and,
therefore, could not be applied "in a manner that constitutes a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade."52
45.
Panel Report, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839 (July 1994)
[hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin 11].See also Panel Report, UnitedStates - Restrictions of Imports of Tuna, 30
I.L.M. 1594 (Nov. 1991) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin I].
46.
Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products,IN 184-86, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle].
47.

Tuna/Dolphin I%supra note 45, at 898.

48.

Id. at 898.

49.
The panel observed that "practice under the bilateral and plurilateral treaties cited could not be
taken as practice under the General Agreement, and therefore could not affect the interpretation of it" and thus
found that "under the general rule contained in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, these treaties were not
relevant as a primary means of interpretation of the text of the General Agreement." Id. at 892.
50.

Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 46,

51.

See id. 185.

52.

Id. 186.

1.
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On the other hand, in the BeefHormones case,53 the WTO Appellate Body
ruled against a European Union import ban on hormone-treated beef from the
United States and Canada on the grounds that it was not based on an adequate
scientific risk assessment. 4 In that case, the Appellate Body dismissed the EU
allegation that the precautionary principle had become a general customary rule
of international law (or at least a general principle of law): even though it
admitted that the precautionary principle "is regarded by some as having
crystallized into a general principle of customary international environmental
law,"55 the Appellate Body declared that, outside that particular field of
international law, the principle "still awaits authoritative formulation."56 In this
instance, however, the WTO Appellate Body referred to the ICJ pronouncement
in the Gabeikovo-Nagymaros Project case,57 in which the Court had
acknowledged the emergence of new environmental norms and standards and
declared that "[s]uch new norms have to be taken into consideration, and such
new standards given proper weight... ."" But in the opinion of the Appellate
Body, the ICJ stopped just short of considering that the precautionary principle
was one of those recently developed norms.59 In Professor Dupuy's view, this
is an example of how specialized judicial bodies can benefit from the insights
and experience of the ICJ in matters related to the interpretation of basic
principles of international law.60
IV. CONCLUSION

The multiplication of international judicial bodies over the last few
decades has given rise to a series of problems, such as jurisdictional overlapping, forum shopping and inconsistent interpretation of rules of law that
should not be underestimated for they may endanger the integrity and
cohesiveness of international law. However, in assessing the repercussions of
this phenomenon, consideration must also be given to the positive aspects of
such institutional build-up. First, the plurality of judicial bodies is indeed a
53.
Appellate Body Report, EC Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter BeefHormones].
54.

Id. 2.

55.

Id. 123.

56.

Id.

57.

Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).

58.

Id. at 78.

59.
BeefHormones,supra note 53, 123 n.93. The WTO Appellate Body added that the ICJ "also
declined to declare that such principle could override the obligations of the Treaty between Czechoslovakia
and Hungary of 16 September 1977 concerning the construction and operation of the Gabikovo-Nagymaros
System of Locks," which was at the heart of the dispute between Hungary and Slovakia in that case. Id.
60.

Dupuy, supra note 7, at 807.
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natural consequence of the expansion and diversification of international law
in a globalized world and reflects an increase in its role in the settlement of
international disputes. Second, institutional multiplicity leaves greater latitude
for experimentation and exploration of new ideas, which can lead to improvements of international law. And third, these fora deal with numerous and often
highly specialized issues that could not be handled by any single international
court. They therefore complement the work of each other and, as a result,
strengthen the system of international law, despite the risk of some losses in
uniformity.6 1
In order to minimize such losses it is essential that all courts become fully
aware of the dangers flowing from the decentralized nature of the international
legal system that this article has sought to identify, and try to avoid them by
acquainting themselves with each other's case-law and by increasing the
mutually enriching interaction that, as seen in the BeefHormones case, already
exists among many of them.

61.
According to Professor Charney, this risk, however real, is not excessively high since in basic
areas of international law (such as the law of treaties, the sources of international law, state responsibility,
the exhaustion of domestic remedies or international maritime boundary law) the different international
tribunals hold "relatively coherent views." Charney, supra note 17, at 699. In his opinion, "[a]lthough
differences exist, these tribunals are clearly engaged in the same dialectic. The fundamentals of this general
international law remain the same regardless of which tribunal decides the case." Id.

